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CONTROLLING CONCEPTIONS IN SYNTACTICAL STUDY.

My purpose in the present paper is to set before you certain conceptions of the nature of the early stages of that parent speech from which the various Indo-European languages have come down; or, to put it more simply, I want to sketch certain probable aspects of the way in which our earliest articulating ancestors talked, and to show how, in the light of these conceptions, we ought to approach syntactical problems.

The more we know of man, the more we incline to believe that he sprang from a very lowly beginning, and spent a long time in reaching the lofty station which is disclosed in the earliest literatures. His first attempts at speech must have been of a very simple and very rude nature.

The earliest perceptions which he would have and would feel the need of expressing must have been those of the senses.¹ He would see things in their various *places*, or changes of place; he would see physical acts; he would hear sounds; he would smell odors. These things formed the drama of his daily life. The earliest relations which he would express between things, would, therefore, be likely to be *space*-relations. It follows that most of the cases, if not all, must originally have expressed rela-

¹ He may, of course, have advanced somewhat beyond this stage before he reached articulate speech at all; but these perceptions must have formed the larger part of what he at first had to convey.

tions in space. His earliest nouns must have expressed things touched, seen, etc. His earliest verbs must have denoted physical activity, *e. g.*, *seizing, carrying, striking, hearing, smelling*, etc. As for the force of his earliest verb-form, it probably expressed merely action or state, together with the idea of person, and with no differentiation of mood or tense. For it is altogether likely that the first distinctions of which he would feel the need in his verb-forms were those of person;¹ and it is also quite impossible to believe that a fully developed system of moods and tenses sprang into existence all at once.

Now do the facts of language, as we find them, agree with this statement of probabilities, or do they contradict it?

With regard to three of the cases of the parent speech, there can be no doubt that the facts agree. In various languages we find, for example, that the (true) ablative is used to express the idea of separation, whether this be separation in space, as with *exeo*, or only a figurative separation as with *careo*. We are forced, then, to one of two conclusions: either the mechanism originally expressed separation in space, and was afterward applied to express that vaguer kind of separation which we call figurative, or the first conception was wholly figurative, and the conception of separation in space arose out of this. No one can hesitate between these two conceptions. Similarly, we cannot doubt that the Latin ablative, as used with the preposition *in*, goes back to a true locative force, and that such a type as *in castris est*, "he is in the camp," represents an earlier stage than *magna in spe sum*, "I am in great hopes" (Cic. *Att.* 6, 2, 6).

Again, as one studies the relations of meanings in various words in various languages, one finds, perhaps, an expression of an intangible, immaterial thing in a given word, while another word of the same root indicates a tangible thing, or a physical act. Thus *namas* in Sanskrit means "honor," "reverence." The corresponding verb *nam* likewise means "to honor," "to reverence," but it also means "to bend," "to yield," or "to incline

¹It seems to be clearly established that, in the Semitic languages, the verb is made up of a noun and a personal ending (*cf.* English "boat," "I boat," "you boat," etc.)

toward with affection." Clearly the root in its earliest meaning denoted simply the physical act of *bending*. Our English words and phrases "condescend," "stoop to," "lower one's self to," have evidently had a parallel history. Examples seen both in English and Latin are "fall" or "go down" in the sense of "become impaired," as in "credit has gone down," and Cicero's *fides concidit*, "burn" in the sense of "be eager," as in "burns with curiosity," and the Latin *ardet abire fuga*, etc., etc. The tendency of modern workers accordingly is to seek origins, as far as possible, in *sense-conceptions*, even when studying words apparently so far from sense-meanings as the Latin *volo*, English "will," and the like.

As for the earliest mechanism of the verb, relics of it seem still to be scattered about in the languages descended from the parent speech. Here I touch upon matters not quite so evident, and upon which there has not yet been serious reflection. One recalls at once, however, such expressions as *priusquam respondeo* "before I answer" (Cic. *Phil.* 2, 1, 3), and recognizes that substantially the same idea is conveyed by this as by *priusquam respondeam*, with the subjunctive. One recalls such expressions as *si permanent*, "if they remain" (Cic. *Cat.* 2, 5, 11), and remembers that, in the same oration of Cicero, the same idea is expressed later by *si permanebunt*, the future indicative (Cic. *Cat.* 2, 8, 18). English and German also have these idioms. We say, *e. g.*: "Before this happens, we must do so and so," "If this happens," we shall we ruined, and the like. These are only a few instances of constructions found in greater or less degree in Sanskrit, Latin, English, German, and other languages of our family. The grammars generally say little about them, and, when they do say anything, endeavor to treat this so-called present indicative as really expressing something *as good as now going on*, that is, as only a modification of the true present indicative. Such a treatment is at variance with the facts. When Dido, for example, says: "But I should wish the depths of earth to yawn for me before I wrong thee, Modesty," *ante, Pudor, quam te violo* (*Aen.* 4, 24), her feeling is that of strong aversion, and not that the wrong is as good as done. This is

only one of a great many instances in which grammarians and editors have started with a certain conception and forced all the facts to accommodate themselves to this conception.

Let me now, in the light of these general considerations, rapidly sketch what seems to me to have been in all probability the earliest force of the cases and the general character of the later developments.

Of the eight cases of the parent speech, one, as is generally agreed, expressed simply the name, and was therefore rightly called the nominative. Relics of this earliest use, in which it did not yet express the subject, are to be found in various languages. Nepos, for instance, is very fond of beginning his "Lives" with the name of the person, in what we call the nominative case. This done, he may perhaps go on with *hic, huius, in hoc, or de hoc*. The nominative form really means nothing but the name. Instances are also to be found in Greek. They are common enough in English likewise, in the conversational style, or imitations of it. You will recall from Lowell's *Biglow Papers* the lines :

But John P.
Robinson he
Says that is his view o' the thing to a "T."

The third person singular of the verb in our family of languages shows traces, in its termination, of a personal pronoun. This in the beginning was the subject of the verb, while the nominative was the mere naming-case (as in "John P. Robinson, he says"). But the pronoun in time became an indistinguishable part of the verb, and so ceased to be felt as a pronoun at all. This left the nominative in the position of *subject* to the verb (as in "John P. Robinson says").

The question of the earliest force of the genitive is a very difficult one. It may have expressed simply the conception of possession, which conception may originally have included the partitive idea, as in *multi Romanorum*, "many belonging to the Romans," that is, "many *of* the Romans." On the other hand, there are certain uses which hint at some conception of space-relation as having been the earliest meaning, as, *e. g.*, the Greek

αὐτοῦ, "there." Let us pass this case by, however, since I have no new light to throw upon its history.

Of the remaining cases, dative, accusative, true ablative, locative, and instrumental, three clearly express or involve space-relation. These are the true ablative, which expresses separation in space; the locative, which expresses location in space; and the instrumental, which originally expressed association in space, and ought, from every point of view, to have been named the sociative (the idea of instrument, which has given it its name of "instrumental," being only a secondary and derivative one).

There remain two extremely important and constantly recurring space conceptions, namely that of *motion toward something*, and that of *contact*, with the closely related conception of *neighborhood*; and there remain two cases, the dative and the accusative. It is extremely probably that these two cases expressed these two meanings. But which expressed direction in space, and which expressed contact or neighborhood?

The actual forces of the accusative may be grouped under three heads. The case may express (1) the direct object of an active verb; or (2) space-relation, which may or may not be the relation of motion (for example, *in castra*, "to the camp," but also *ante castra*, in "front of the camp"); and (3) respect, as seen in a great number of instances in Greek, and occasionally in Sanskrit, Latin, etc. Now, no theory as yet exists that will satisfactorily connect all of these forces. If you start with the theory that the accusative originally expressed the end of motion, you can possibly account for the accusative of the direct object as arising out of the conception of that upon which activity is directed; but you will find it hard to account for the accusative of respect, and quite impossible to account for the accusative with prepositions that contain no suggestion of motion. If you start with the idea of the direct object, it is hard to get to the construction after a preposition implying motion, and still harder to get to the construction after a preposition that has no implication of motion in it. As for beginning with the construction of respect, no one has yet ventured upon that.

The accusative, then, remains a dark case. The most modern

tendency is to regard it as the case which took upon itself all the functions which the other cases did not possess (thus Gädecke and Delbrück). This seems to me merely a solution of despair. It is extremely improbable that the rude ancestor into whose life we have been endeavoring to enter had such vague conceptions to express by cases as to make any one of them the general catch-all for relations not otherwise provided for. It is probable, on the contrary, that his conceptions were of a very definite and simple kind. We ought, therefore, in the light of what we have seen, to look for a simple and definite conception; and this should be one of *space*. As already noted, it cannot be that of direction in space; for such an original meaning could not have given rise to all the actual uses which we find. We are thus brought, by exclusion, to the hypothesis of an original force of contact, with its closely allied conception of neighborhood.

Let us see, now, what would naturally happen to the case if it began with this meaning. Our rude ancestors, if they wanted to express ideas of contact or neighborhood, such as we express by prepositions, would have had to be content with the bare case alone. But then everybody would agree that they had to be content with bare cases for *all kinds* of space-relations; for it is an accepted theory, borne out by abundant facts, that prepositions are nothing but adverbs that have taken on a new power of expressing relation, and that these adverbs were originally, at least in large part, nothing but cases themselves. We must be content, then, to let our primitive man talk in a very rude way. If he wanted to say, when the family went to bed for the night, "push the rock against the door," he would simply say something like "push rock door"—and none of his children would be likely to misunderstand him. If his cave were attacked, and he wanted to organize a defense, he would not be able to say "stand beside the door," but would simply say "stand door," and again would be understood. The next stage would consist in the rise of adverbs to indicate more exactly the relations that had been vaguely indicated before. At a certain point, then, one could say "stand door, behind," "stand door, in

front," etc. But these adverbs would now seem to indicate more precisely the *relation between* the verb and the noun. They would therefore seem to *introduce* the noun, and would accordingly be put before it, whence the name of "preposition." In such ways, with the help of prepositions, the accusative became the case which could express any of the space-relations. Naturally, it did not, in any large degree, invade the relations already provided for by the ablative, the locative and the sociative cases, though even here there is just enough confusion to make the above theory very probable. So, for instance, you find *post*, "behind," "after," governing the accusative in Latin, while in the Oscan and Umbrian dialects, the close relatives of Latin, it takes the ablative—doubtless of the point of view *from which* one starts in estimating the space-relation (compare *pro*, "in front," which, though one would expect it to take the same case as *ante* and *post*, takes the ablative of the point of view from which. The case in Latin *postea*, *posthac*, etc., may be due to the same reason). In the main, however, the true ablative, the sociative, and the locative cases keep their own territory to themselves.

The second power of the accusative, that of expressing the direct object, arose in a very simple and wholly inevitable way from combinations of accusatives with active verbs of contact, as in "push the stone," "strike the man," and the like. That which originally expressed the object of *physical contact* came to seem to express the object of the *activity*. This feeling would also rapidly grow, as words took on figurative meanings, as in the case of *urgeo*, "push," "urge," "prompt," "incite," "burden," etc.

The third force, the apparently mysterious one of respect, is probably of extremely simple origin. The accusative simply indicates that upon which the thought *touches*. Surely this should not be regarded as a difficult or improbable solution, if one bears in mind that, in the St. James translation of the Bible, the phrase "touching," or "as touching" occurs twenty-six times in the sense of "as regards," and is used interchangeably with the latter phrase, for example in *Romans* 11:28, "as concerning the gospel, they are enemies for your sakes; but as touching the elec-

tion, they are beloved for the father's sakes." Even today, indeed, one often hears the same phrase in the same sense; and the corresponding "touchant" is common in French with the same meaning.

A wholly satisfactory explanation, then, of the three great families of relations expressed by the accusative seems to be afforded by the theory which I have advanced, that it originally expressed one of the most important space-conceptions. But the theory receives additional support from the perfect way in which the dative meets the requirements for the remaining leading space-relation, that of direction in space. This case is found in actual literature to have two forces, that of literal direction, as in Virgil's "rises to the heavens," and that of figurative direction, as in "gives to the poor," "kind to his neighbors," and the like. The literal force still appears with great frequency in our earliest Greek documents, the Homeric poems. It maintains itself in Latin prose (perhaps with a slight shading toward the idea of the indirect object, which was developed out of it), after *fero* and *mitto* (thus *ad te mitto* and *tibi mitto*); and it appears sporadically in poetry, and in very late prose. In the main, however, the accusative took from the dative the expression of the idea of literal direction in space; for the accusative, by its very nature, was fitted, after the rise of the prepositions *ad*, *in*, etc., to express the contact or nearness which ordinarily results from motion toward anything.

This general view of the dative is one of the two that have been held in the past. It is at present the unfashionable view. But it has not hitherto been supported by a satisfactory explanation of the accusative. I believe that, with this backing, it will triumph. Moreover, the theory affords a very beautiful solution, not hitherto proposed, of the origin of the use of the dative in Latin and Greek after verbs compounded with certain prepositions. Of the compounds occurring most frequently in Cicero and Cæsar with this construction, the verb in the large majority of cases either denotes literal motion, or originally denoted it. *Adfero*, *infero*, *adicio*, *inicio*, *accido*, are familiar examples. My theory is that the dative as originally used,

after *adfero* or *infero*, for example, was precisely the same thing as the dative after the simple *fero*, namely, the expression of direction in space.¹ The *in*, when it first appeared, was a mere adverb. In this class of compounds the adverbs never advanced beyond the adverbial stage, but, on the contrary, became welded into one mass with the verb. In consequence, no new influence was exerted, as *was* exerted when the adverb became a true preposition, to change the construction of the dependent dative. The type accordingly became fixed. Doubtless other types also came into existence, as with *intersum*, which would originally take an accusative; but the large preponderance of the dative type with original verbs of motion overpowered these outlying types, and made the dative the construction for them all.

I should be glad, if there were time, to take up the matter of the earliest forces of the moods, and to sketch the probable ways in which the leading secondary forces were developed from these.¹ Anyone who has studied the various theories about the Latin subjunctive and the Greek subjunctive and optative knows that there has been no satisfactory explanation of the historical relations of the various forces. There has remained, for example, an unbridged chasm between the optative of wish and the potential optative. But I must here confine myself to a sketch of a very primitive form of conversation, and a general hint about the subsequent development of mood-expression. I have said that I believed the earliest verb of the parent speech of the Indo-European family of languages to have expressed merely the idea of activity (or state) together with that of person. Let us suppose, then, that we have an inflection like "I go," "you go," "he go," etc.; and let us imagine how a little fellow of the earliest period would think and talk in projecting, carrying out, and afterwards narrating a fishing excursion. In the morning, perhaps, he is in doubt whether to fish or hunt. Instead of using the deliberate subjunctive, as a later boy would have been able to do, he would think to himself: "I go hunting? I go fishing?" Finally he resolves, "I go fishing,"

¹ See footnote, p. 427.

where a later boy would have used the volitive subjunctive ("I will go fishing"), and a still later one the future indicative. His wish (later optative) for somebody's companionship, let us say Johnny's, would express itself in, "Johnny, he go too." He goes to Johnny and says, "I go fishing, you go too" (later imperative, volitive, or optative for the second verb). Johnny's mother not being a negligible factor, he goes to her, announces his intention and prefers his request, "I go fishing; Johnny, he go too" (later, imperative, volitive, or optative for the second best), and expresses a conviction that *if* they go, they will make a big catch—"we go, we catch much fish" (future condition and conclusion). Johnny's mother gives her consent by saying: "Johnny, he go" (later imperative, volitive, or optative), but prudently advises, "you eat before you go" (the last verb corresponding to the later anticipatory subjunctive). They go, and the organizer of the expedition narrates the story the day after in the form: "Johnny and I, we go fishing yesterday; we catch much fish" (historical present).

The new moods, imperative, subjunctive, and optative, probably came into existence later, each with a single and fairly simple meaning. With these meanings others became associated, so that the powers of the moods became gradually enlarged. At every step of the process these differentiated moods took from the original set of verb-forms something of its functions, until gradually the range of the latter was narrowed down, in ordinary use, to the expression of true indicative and true present ideas. Other tenses—perfect, imperfect, future, etc.—were then built up to correspond to this present indicative. Nevertheless, the primitive present indicative, as we may call it, never wholly lost its original powers, but continued to be used, from time to time, in a number of them. Indeed, the greater part of the planning, conversation, and narration sketched above could have been expressed by a Roman of literary times in precisely the same way. The so-called present indicative is actually found, here and there, to express deliberation, resolve, consent, anticipation (as after *antequam* and *priusquam*), a state-

ment about the future, a future condition, and a fact of the past (historical present).¹

If, now, each of the cases, and each of the moods except the primitive present indicative, had at first a single meaning, it is obvious—and has, indeed, been assumed in all that I have said—that a great number of new constructions have arisen out of these simple ones. Otherwise our grammars would be far shorter and far simpler than they are. Can we put our finger upon the processes by which these changes have taken place? I think we can, and that the description of them can be condensed into a few formulæ. Briefly, growths of construction come about mainly in four ways. Let me first name them, and then illustrate them.

1. Through the *figurative use* of a case, a mood, or a tense.
2. Through the *association* of a new idea with an existing construction.
3. Through the *fusion* of two or more constructions into one.
4. Through *analogy*, *i. e.*, the influence of one or more constructions upon another resembling them in meaning.

The first two ways are similar to ways in which changes take place in the meanings of words, and can be best explained in the light of these changes.

1. *Figurative use*.—Many words of sense perception are used to express something which bears an evident relation to a thing perceived by the senses, yet is different. For example, just as we say "the fire burns," so we say "the man burns with anger." In a precisely similar way we use prepositions of space-relations to express ideas which really have nothing to do with space. So, for example, just as we say "he flees from the camp," *ex castris fugit*, we may say "sick from a wound," *ex vulnere aeger* (Cic. *Rep.*, 2, 21, 38). In the first example the separation is really one in space; in the second, it is a figurative one.

2. *Association of ideas*.—This can be best understood by illus-

¹ The theories here presented for the accusative and dative cases and for the present indicative, together with a sketch of the rise of the principal powers of the subjunctive and optative, will be found in two abstracts in the *Proceedings of the American Philological Association*, 1901. The papers will be published in full in the *Indogermanische Forschungen*.

tration from changes of meaning in words. Let us take a familiar Roman word, that of the site of the original city. The name *Palatium* seems originally to have meant something like "the shepherd's hill," and at any rate denoted simply a certain definite spot in Rome. But in imperial times the emperors built splendid buildings upon this hill, and the word came in consequence, through these new associations, to gain a second meaning, that of a splendid building. Ovid has it in this sense in the phrase "the palaces of great heaven," and this is the sense in which we use the modern descendant of the word today. What takes place in such cases can be conveniently stated in a brief algebraic formula. Let x equal the original meaning of a word; and let y indicate an additional meaning which, either in the nature of things, or by chance, becomes attached to this original meaning. The word, at this stage, has two meanings, for either of which it can be used: namely, the original one, x , and the original one *plus* its new association, that is, $x + y$. But in such a case the original meaning is frequently lost, so that nothing but y remains, as when today we speak of a palace, having no thought whatever of any shepherds, or of any hill in Rome. Of course the process can be continued indefinitely, a new meaning, z , becoming associated with the meaning y , with a possible ultimate loss of both x and y , so that in the end no element may remain of the original meaning, or even of the second meaning. Such is the case, for instance, with the Italian word *cattivo*, "bad," the corresponding French *chetif*, and our word "caitiff," all of which came originally from the Latin *captivus*, "a prisoner of war."

Now this process of change through association and loss is as sure to have taken place in the history of mood-ideas and case ideas, as to have taken place in the history of the meanings of words. An altogether probable illustration in mood-usage is the following: The volitive subjunctive in its original free use could be employed to express a command, as in *id facias*, "do this." But this command might be given under circumstances that seemed to the hearer to make it unreasonable. If he echoed the command in the form of the question, *id faciam?* "am I to

do that?" a new feeling, that of surprise, remonstrance or indignation, would become a part of the idea in effect conveyed. The total meaning of the question at this stage was $x + y$. The inevitable result would be that in time the original meaning, x , would disappear, leaving nothing but an *exclamation* of surprise, remonstrance, or indignation, without any idea of question. The meaning is now simply "the idea of my doing that!" or, in the language of our formula, simply y . A striking example of the construction at this extreme stage of development may be seen in a familiar passage in the *Second Oration against Catiline*, 8, 18: *tu rebus omnibus ornatus et copiosus sis, et dubites!* "the idea of your being abundantly equipped with everything, and yet hesitating!"

3. *Fusion*.—Two or more constructions which, though of different origin, have the same form and possess a certain meaning in common, may mingle together in one construction, expressing that common meaning only.

The example which I shall use is taken from the results of my study of the descriptive genitive and ablative, which results, I am sorry to say, differ from those of the very interesting dissertation published a couple of years ago by Mr. Edwards. My views have been published in abstract in the *Proceedings of the American Philological Association for 1900*, and the whole paper will be printed ultimately in the *American Journal of Philology*. I shall today merely briefly sketch my conception of the way in which the genitive construction came into existence.

In a number of phrases a genitive which is, in origin, merely possessive, may also happen to *describe*; as when we say "a man belonging to the senatorial order," *homo senatorii ordinis*; "a man belonging to this class," *homo huius generis*, or, in commoner English, "a man of the senatorial order," "a man of this class." Here the case which originally expressed the possessive or possessive-partitive idea (let us call this a), *happens* also to suggest a descriptive idea, y , so that the meaning is now $a + y$. On the other side, we often find an explanatory (appositional) genitive which also *happens* to describe. When, for example, we say "a fleet of a hundred ships," *classis centum navium*, the genitive,

which really explains what the fleet is (the fleet *is* the one hundred ships), happens at the same time to describe, through the idea of quantity. In algebraic formula, the meaning is $b+y$. The idea of description, y , is common now to both factors, the factor $a+y$ in the case of the originally possessive genitive, and the factor $b+y$ in the case of the originally explanatory genitive. But the case-form, the genitive, is the same in both instances. Naturally enough, then, this case-form seems to have the *power of describing*. The inevitable result is that it is freely used to convey this idea, so that abundant examples occur in which one finds no trace either of the original possessive meaning, a , or of the original explanatory meaning, b , as for example, when we say "a young man of great courage," "a wall of ten feet in height." What happens in such a case is that the two constructions come ultimately into complete fusion, the result of which is a single construction, in which only the element common to both the original constructions appears, while the individual, and consequently mutually exclusive elements, of the original constructions have been wholly lost. This, again, may be put in algebraic formula, as follows: If a meaning, y , becomes associated with each of two or more different constructions, a , b , etc., so that the meanings are respectively $a+y$, $b+y$, etc., the result is likely to be a fused construction in which the meaning y alone is conveyed, the original meanings, a , b , etc., being lost. It is my belief that this process has played a very large part in language, and that its influence explains many constructions which hitherto have been dark.

4. *Analogy*.—A very simple and interesting case in Latin is Quintilian's use (10, 1, 74) of a subjunctive *qui*-clause after *meretur*, on the analogy of the *qui*-clause after the equivalent *dignus est*.

I have not covered the entire ground in this sketch. A careful analysis can show still further influences through which these changes tended to come about, or which assisted these changes. One of these has indirectly been included in the above, namely, the cause of the association of a new meaning with an older one in a mood-construction lies chiefly in the nature of the circum-

stances under which, in a given instance, the mood is used. These circumstances, so to speak, give a new *color* to the construction. Thus, in the case of the subjunctive of surprise, remonstrance, or indignation, it is the unreasonableness of the thing required that brings the new idea into the volitive question, and so leads to the final employment of the volitive form to express this idea alone.

In a recent book of much interest, entitled *On Principles and Methods in Syntax*, my friend, Professor E. P. Morris, states that Delbrück and "the American school" (as he calls Mr. Elmer, Mr. Bennett, and myself) regard the moods as in themselves containing all the ideas which we find in actual usage, and overlook the influence of circumstances, and of the contents of the sentence outside the verb, in affecting the force of constructions. I agree with Morris's position to this extent, that our grammars say far too little of the influences that have tended to make constructions what they are; but I differ entirely with regard to his statement about the methods employed either by Delbrück or by the "American school." The passages from which I have taken the above sketch of the causes of the growth and changes in constructions were in type before Morris's book appeared, and cover more ground than his treatment of principle has covered. The particular algebraic formulæ which I have used to illustrate association and loss and fusion are my own; but the idea of fusion in constructions, though not put forth with sufficient clearness and insistence, has been recognized by various workers, and so has the idea of association and loss, though again not with a sharp precision of statement. There is no other single point that has played so large a part as the last in my own published investigations. It lies at the basis of my treatment of the "Cum-Constructions," published fourteen years ago, and a very explicit statement about it is made in the discussion of methods true and false (p. 247). Professor Bennett and Professor Elmer have prominently employed it (see Bennett's *Appendix, passim*, and Elmer's *Cornell Studies in Classical Philology*, VI). Delbrück's whole scheme of the rise of the various subjunctive

and optative forces out of a single original one in each case is implicitly based upon it. Indeed, the existing Latin and Greek grammars, even those of the last generation of workers, are full of instances of the tacit application of this principle.

WM. GARDNER HALE.

THE UNIVERSITY OF CHICAGO